

OSS: Donovan

Mar. - Sept. 20, 1944

The White House,
Washington.

March 22, 1944

Dear Bill:

I understand that the matter of sending intelligence officers into the area controlled by the Mihailovic forces has been in discussion between your people and the State Department. The situation as it now stands is that with the withdrawal of the British mission, including our liaison officers who were connected with the mission in the Mihailovic territory, we have no sources of intelligence whatever in a part of the Balkans which may become an important area at some stage of the war.

I completely approve of the plan which I understand you have proposed, and in which the State Department agrees, that we should continue to obtain intelligence from that area, by sending in a new group only for this purpose.

In order that there should be no misunderstanding, it should be made clear to the British that, in accordance with the established policy and practice, we intend to exercise this freedom of action for obtaining independent American secret intelligence.

The officers who may be sent in should also inform Mihailovic that they are there for intelligence work, and expect to have his help and protection, but they must also make him clearly understand that they are not a substitute for the general liaison or operations people who have been withdrawn.

The officers themselves should be instructed, and they should also make this clear to Mihailovic, that they are not to become involved in political questions or permit political functions to be attributed to them.

This is essential, lest these American officers be drawn into a position whereby, if the relations between Mihailovic and the British do not improve, he might try to play off, against the British, these American contacts.

I also think that the Office of Strategic Services should continue its plan for infiltration of intelligence teams into central and southeastern Europe. In view of the difficulties which might arise if the Mihailovic headquarters were to be designated as a special channel for such work,

-2-

it would probably be better to examine all means of entry to the territories in question without indicating a particular intention to make use of Mihailovic's facilities for sending teams into other regions.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

General William J. Donovan,

Director,


Office of Strategic Services.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 21, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum of March 3, covering a copy of General Donovan's memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the matter of liaison officers in that part of Yugoslavia controlled by General Mihailovic, there is enclosed for your approval a draft of a letter to General Donovan which in the Department's opinion would cover the points raised by the Office of Strategic Services.

Faithfully yours,

A large, cursive handwritten signature, likely of Cordell Hull, written in dark ink. The signature is fluid and spans across the width of the page below the typed name.

Enclosure:

Draft of letter
to General Donovan.

The President,
The White House.

Donovan memo 2-44

*File
personal.*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

2 March 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you be good enough to hand
this to the President for me? Thank you.

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "W. J. Donovan". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial "W" and a cursive "J".

William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

2 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a copy of memorandum which I am submitting today to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has to do with the British request for concurrent withdrawal of British and American officers now with Mihailovich.

Attached to the memorandum is an intelligence report by an OSS officer who has been with Mihailovich during the past six months. I believe that it will be of much interest to you.



William J. Donovan
Director

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CIA 006687

By SR Date APR 21 1975

C O P Y

2 March 1944

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BRITISH REQUEST FOR CONCURRENT WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH AND
AMERICAN OFFICERS WITH MIHAILOVICH

MEMORANDUM FROM THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Facts Bearing on the Problem:

1. Under SOE-OSS agreement entered into in June 1942, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 25 August 1942 (JCS 86/1), and supplemented by memorandum between SOE and OSS dated 28 July 1943 (Appendix A), SOE has maintained a liaison mission with Mihailovich to which American officers have been attached.
2. In or about February 1944 the British Foreign Office ruled that no further sorties, except for maintenance, would be flown to the British mission with Mihailovich forces, which ruling forced the withdrawal of such mission.
3. The British state that Mihailovich has refused to take action against the enemy because of risk of reprisals on the Serb population and is continuing attacks jointly with the Germans against the Partisans. For these reasons, the British say that no useful military purpose could be served by remaining in the area. As to the validity of this statement, reference is made to attached intelligence report of an OSS officer who has been with Mihailovich during the past six months (Appendix B).
4. OSS has an officer still with the British mission to Mihailovich. The British, feeling that the Chetniks would use his presence as a means of causing conflict between the British and Americans, are desirous that the OSS officer leave with their personnel, and the British Ambassador to Yugoslavia has made such representations formally to Ambassador MacVeagh.
5. OSS Cairo has prepared at least two intelligence teams to send into Mihailovich territory at the earliest possible moment. Further plans have been made at Mihailovich headquarters for OSS to send intelligence teams into the field.

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under the leadership of uniformed American officers. It is purposed that these officers would maintain liaison with the Mihailovich forces and would also provide facilities for the dispatch of such teams into Central and Southeastern Europe.

6. The Department of State considers it advisable to meet the wishes of the British with respect to withdrawal of the OSS officer now at Mihailovich headquarters and that OSS instruct its representative to leave with his British colleagues. However, in conveying its decision, the Department of State would reassert the American right, through OSS or otherwise, to obtain intelligence in any important area independently of the British.

7. OSS has transmitted instructions to its officer with Mihailovich in accordance with the aforementioned views of the Department of State. This office is informed that the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, has issued similar instructions.

8. The OSS office in Cairo submits the following comment on the attached intelligence report (Appendix B):

"The Chetnik leader continues to have a strong hold over the Serb peasants who support him because he resisted the enemy at the outset and also because he symbolizes democracy and the king. Communism does not seem desirable to the peasants of Central Serbia."

and recommends:

- a. A public break with Mihailovich should be avoided, and
- b. Both Britain and America should continue to maintain observers with Mihailovich.

Recommendations:

9. It is therefore recommended that OSS be authorized:
 - a. To establish immediately at Mihailovich headquarters an OSS intelligence officer in uniform, and
 - b. To continue its plan for the infiltration of intelligence teams into Central and Southeastern Europe through Mihailovich headquarters or otherwise.

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/s/ William J. Donovan
Director

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By SE Date APR 21 1975

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20 August 1943

S. O. E./O. S. S. COLLABORATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. At a meeting held between G. 50,000 and C. D. on 26th July it was stated that S.O.E welcomed American participation in operations into the Balkans.
2. It was realized that any O.S.S. operations into Yugoslavia must be under the control of S.O.E Cairo through their existing missions in that country.
3. It was agreed that :
 - (a) Suitable American officers would be despatched to become members of and participate in the work of S.O.E. main missions to General Mihailovic and Tito.
 - (b) Joint S.O.E./O.S.S. or wholly O.S.S. sub-missions would be established in Yugoslavia as and when required.
 - (c) O.S.S. officers and missions in Yugoslavia would use a joint S.O.E./O.S.S. cipher and S.O.E. War Station at Mena.
4. The above arrangements for Yugoslavia may, by agreement with C.-in-C., and the Theater Commander in the Middle East, be extended to cover Greece and Albania.
5. O.S.S. should make every effort to penetrate Bulgaria and Roumania and establish their own missions there in co-ordination with such S.O.E. organizations as exist, since it is believed O.S.S. have excellent contacts in these territories and are more likely to succeed than S.O.E.
6. The O.S.S. offer to provide expert demolition squads and explosives would provide a most valuable addition to common resources in the Mediterranean.
7. O.S.S. would use their best endeavour to obtain from the American Air Forces now in the Mediterranean suitable aircraft to augment present air transport facilities to the Balkans.
8. Should experience show that any point agreed above requires adjustment, S.O.E. and O.S.S. will consult together and such alterations as are agreed to be necessary will be made.

28th July, 1943

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Yugoslavia: Appraisal of Mihailovich's Position.

The following is a summary of a report made by an OSS officer who has been a member of the Allied Military Mission with the Mihailovich forces. This officer traveled extensively in Mihailovich territory, where he stayed for six months, leaving Yugoslavia the 15th of February. During this period he was able to inspect troops at various locations and to form an opinion on the combat ability, morale, operations, and supply situation of the Chetnik army:

1. Mihailovich claims that he has 57,000 men armed and ready for combat and that he could mobilize an additional 500,000 combat troops. Source's tentative belief is that 35,000 is a more correct estimate of the mobilized forces.

2. Mihailovich gives the following figures on the military equipment of his army: 65 mortars, 1200 light machine guns, over 300 heavy machine guns, 90,000 rifles, and 300 machine pistols. He has, however, almost no artillery. Source estimates that the army is equipped with an average of 150 rounds of ammunition for each machine gun and 25 rounds per rifle.

3. For the past three years the Chetnik soldiers have lived in the woods, serving without compensation and without adequate clothing. In addition, reprisals have often been visited on their families. When these factors are considered, the morale and discipline of the Chetnik army in Serbia may be considered excellent. In Herzegovina and southern Dalmatia morale is not so high. Most of the soldiers had received two years of military training before the outbreak of hostilities.

4. The territory under the Mihailovich control is roughly as follows: north and south Serbia, portions of Montenegro, Herzegovina, east Bosnia, Vojvodina, east Slavonia and south Dalmatia. According to Mihailovich's estimate, approximately 8,000,000 persons are included in this territory.

5. Since September and October 1943 there has been negligible fighting between Mihailovich and the Nazi forces, except for a period of a month following the surrender of Italy, during which time there was considerable activity.

DECLASSIFIED 6. The policy pursued by Mihailovich is to delay combat
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against the Nazis until D-Day, at which time he will concentrate on a large-scale revolt. His aims are to forestall severe reprisals which earlier hostilities would entail, and to maintain the Serb population, both numerically and ethnically, as opposed to the Croats. Mihailovich claims that he does not have sufficient arms and ammunition to prevent reprisals of this kind. He describes his forces as a "one-shot army" which would be obliterated by the Nazis if he should attempt large-scale operations before D-Day. He cites as an illustration the consequences suffered by his troops when he undertook a revolt during the last part of 1941, at a time when the Allies were generally suffering reverses on all battle fronts. He also complains of the failure of the Allies to give him their assurance that over-all Allied strategy reserves a place for the operations which he intends to undertake.

7. Mihailovich and his leaders have absolutely no confidence in the British, since they believe that the latter have determined to disregard Mihailovich and back the Partisans. As evidence to support their opinion they refer to a broadcast by the BBC in London which gave out false reports, crediting Tito with extensive operations against the Nazis last October and November; these actions were in reality carried out by Mihailovich's forces.

8. On the other hand, the British accuse Mihailovich of refraining from fighting the Germans, and even go so far as to charge that he is collaborating with the enemy. One bone of contention is the fact that Mihailovich has failed to cut the strategic main north-south communication lines to Bulgaria and Greece. Mihailovich promised to carry out this operation, and the British dispatched supplies to be used for the project. The British feel that Mihailovich's insincerity is apparent from his failure to make good his promise.

9. At the present time, the Chetniks are concentrating most of their strength in bitter civil war against Tito's forces in Herzegovina, east Bosnia, and further to the south. Mihailovich takes the position that this is by and large a racial conflict against the Croats. He insists that more than three-fourths of the Partisans are treacherous Croats, a large number of whom are Quisling Ustachi; that it was they who decimated the Serb population in 1941 and 1942, and are resolved to establish Croat supremacy regardless of the consequences; and that they were traitors who threw in their lot with the Partisans only when an Allied victory became a probability.

10. Source saw no indications of collaboration between the Germans and the Chetniks, except for liaison with gendarmes of Nedich south of Belgrade at Aranjelovac and east of Valjevo at Belanovica. The reason given for this liaison was that it was a method of obtaining information on Nazi movements. In

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southern Herzegovina and Dalmatia there is collaboration between the Nazis and the Chetniks to the extent that the latter are permitted freedom of movement in some parts of the region and are not attacked by the Nazis. Source observed no sign that Mihailovich himself was aware of this collaboration, nor did he see anything to indicate that the Germans are supplying the Chetniks with arms.

11. Source did not observe any Partisans in north central Serbia, with the exception of a group of approximately 1000 which he saw west of Ivanjica during January. According to the Chetniks this band has now been surrounded. A band of Partisans was reported in the Zlatibor area, but its size was unknown.

12. Mihailovich continues to have a strong hold over the Serb peasants, who support him because he resisted the enemy at the outset and also because he symbolizes democracy and the King. Communism does not seem desirable to the peasants of central Serbia.

13. Mihailovich did not disclose to source his own opinions of the Purich government in Cairo. However, his entourage was unanimous in believing that the Serb people favor the King but oppose the government-in-exile and are not anxious to have the latter returned to Yugoslavia.

The OSS office in Cairo makes these comments on the report:

- a. The report is regarded as a reliable appraisal.
- b. It indicates that the British have underestimated Mihailovich's present and potential strength.
- c. It indicates further that the Partisans are not making substantial advances in Serbia proper; and information has been indirectly received substantiating this fact.
- d. In the opinion of that office, Tito will be unsuccessful in any attempt to "liquidate" Mihailovich while the Nazis occupy Yugoslavia unless King Peter discontinues his support of the Mihailovich cause.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

CONFIDENTIAL

27 March 1944

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA 007622

By *ABD*

Date MAY 1 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I think you will be interested in work we have done which promises to be of value in photo interpretation. This work was carried on by Lt. N. H. Juran, USNR, of our Field Photographic Branch. Some of it was carried on in the field with your son Elliott's North African Photo Reconnaissance Wing. The bulk of the work was done in England with the Central Photo Interpretation Unit, which is the British photo intelligence center.

The principles have other uses than photo interpretation. For example, they provide a new method of underwater depth determination, a means for enabling pilots to make accurate estimates of the sizes of ships they sight and a method which enables a person with no knowledge of perspective to draw panoramic field sketches and perspective target maps in a fraction of the time formerly required by trained personnel. Brief summaries of these developments are contained in the attached appendix, and I also attach printed booklets which deal with the separate applications in more detail.

*4 copies of B & C are filed
in my folder*

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
(25) J. D. MONTGOMERY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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We have made these developments available to the
Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces and the Navy.

William J. Donovan
Director

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These photos were taken from the sea
by a small boat. The photos are the best
of the series.

APPENDIX

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1. Iconography - Photo Interpretation of Oblique Photographs

This development makes possible the interpretation of oblique photographs in a manner not heretofore possible and thus broadens the field of usefulness of oblique photographs for intelligence purposes. It also makes possible measurement of objects such as enemy military installations, sea walls, low level bombing obstructions, tank traps, enemy beach gradients, etc., directly from a single oblique photograph. The principle may also be used to determine silhouettes of enemy shipping, to plot convoys and to measure the length of unknown ships. A full description is contained in the attached Annex "A" entitled "Iconography".

2. Underwater Depth Determination

It is possible by this application of the principle described in the preceding paragraph to determine underwater depths of enemy beaches from a combination of oblique and vertical photographs taken at approximately the same time. It requires favorable conditions, but conditions are favorable for this method when they are unfavorable for the wave interval method of underwater depth determination. The two methods, therefore, supplement each other. Further work is being done on this problem. A full description is contained in the attached Annex "B" entitled "Under Water Depth Determination".

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3. Jeriscope

The Jeriscope is a device which makes possible the production of perspective drawings of target maps from any desired viewpoint. It enables untrained personnel to produce in less than thirty minutes accurate perspectives which would otherwise take trained personnel more than six hours to complete and which, under field conditions, might not be possible at all. It is especially useful in the field in connection with panoramic field sketching and is therefore of special interest to the Army. A description of the Jeriscope is contained in the attached Annex "C" entitled "Perspective Through Jeriscope".

4. Pilot's Iconometer

This is a simple, portable device which a pilot may use while flying. It enables him to make a better estimate than is otherwise possible as to the length of ships he sights and the distance between pilot and ship. It is also usable for estimating lengths of runways and ground distances. It is fully described in the attached Annex "D" entitled "Pilot's Iconometer".

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

BILL DONOVAN

In regard to yours of May twenty-third about the Algiers' report -- there is just nothing to it. I do not think the Prime Minister has done such a thing and certainly I have not been communicated with.

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to Col. Donovan.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

One of our representatives who has just arrived from Algiers reports that the French there assert that they have heard that a message from the Prime Minister to General Wilson directs him to take De Gaulle into his confidence in relation to the Italian matter and that means would be found to settle the question of communications. They further state that you approved this.

William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

One of our representatives who has just arrived from Algiers reports that the French there assert that they have heard that a message from the Prime Minister to General Wilson directs him to take De Gaulle into his confidence in relation to the Italian matter and that means would be found to settle the question of communications. They further state that you approved this.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'William J. Donovan', with a stylized, cursive script.

William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 May 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am attaching a short memorandum
for the President. Will you please be good enough
to see that it is brought to his attention. Thank
you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bill", written in a cursive style.

William J. Donovan
Director

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original

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON:

I want to see Bill Donovan
sometime next week.

F.D.R.

W.H. back

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Bill Donovan called. He is just back from France. He thought when you had a minute he would like to come in and talk with you.

GGT

Donovan from 2-44
fel → ~~TOP SECRET~~
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Bx 167

16 June 1944

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you be good enough to place the
attached memorandum before the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
William J. Donovan,
Director.

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By Authority of CIA

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By APL Date JUN 11 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

16 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I think you will be interested in the Situation Reports which we are receiving on operations jointly undertaken in France by the British SOE and the Special Operations Branch of OSS. I enclose the first nine reports.

To assist you in interpreting these reports I have had prepared for you a base map and five overlays. They, together with a key to the various code designations, accompany this memorandum.

Additional reports will be forwarded as soon as they are received.


William J. Donovan
Director

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By WJS JUN 11 1973

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13 June 1944

SOE/SO SITUATION REPORT NO. 1

LONDON TELEGRAM NO. 579 DATED 7TH JUNE 1944

All F., R.F., and E.U.P. action messages despatched night 5/6 June. Massingham reports reception long wave clear no jamming short wave heavily jammed after break in announcement. E.U.P. messages already acknowledged. Three S.A.S. reconnaissance parties despatched night 5/6 June intention of establishing base further S.A.S. troops first area Chateauroux L. 5101 second area West of Redon H. 6905 third area South West Guincamp R. 5911 safe arrival all three parties confirmed.

Butler, Delegate and Satirist circuits blown. Benjoin mission in Cantal reported June 4th only one company of two thousand men in Maquis armed. Clermont Railway workers eager to join Maquis and request orders.

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By DBS

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13 June 1944

SOE/SO SITUATION REPORT NO. 2
LONDON TELEGRAM NO. 586 June 8, 1944

SACRISTAN Diplomat DIGGER MASON DONKEY-man SCHOLAR ACT receipt of action messages. Marksman has started operations against road traffic LYON BESANCON route and rail traffic line MODANE AMBERIEU LYON 50 engines 2 turn-tables machine shop at AMBERIEU sabotaged night 6/7 June. DONKEY-man reports June 6th his teams started attacks road telephone targets. Treasurer reports June 7th all railway telephone targets blown. Results unknown. Plan VERT plan TORTUE plan GUERILLA reported June 7th in full swing in INDRE particularly area LE BLANC Q. Queen 08 where 400 armed men. JEDBURGH HUGH dropped night 5/6 June with S.A.S. party area CHATEAUROUX reports June 7th contact established resistance chief INDRE area. Whole area practically controlled by resistance group. Existing MAQUIS doubled in forty-eight hours. Can ensure permanent cut Toulouse railway by MAQUIS.

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By DBS JUN 11 1973

13 June 1944

SOE/SOE SITUATION REPORT NO. 3
LONDON TELEGRAM NO. 595 DATED JUNE 9TH, 1944

DIGGER reports June 8th tremendous reaction DORDOGNE to invasion news. All first objectives attacked. MAQUIS GERARDMER V. 34 VOSGES region defeated 2400 Germans taking 300 prisoners. JEDBURGH HUGH reports June 8th impossible limit number joining resistance consequence spontaneous uprising. S.A.S. party REDON area BRITTANY report contact made with H.Q. resistance group 3500 men in need of arms. Detective report railway CARCASSONNE CASTELNAUDRY cut and Junker has been informed. All traffic roads NARBONNE CARCASSONNE and CARCASSONNE MONT LOUIS. SCHOLAR reports destruction CENTRALE TELEPHONIQUE and despatched Dole station. Telephone cable from Strassburg cut and several points railway line Scuffle around Dole. S.A.S. party with JEDBURGH Harry despatched night 6/7 June MORVAN mountains intention establish base further S.A.S. troops harass enemy L. of C.

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13 June 1944

SOE/SO SITUATION REPORT NO. 4
LONDON TELEGRAM NO. 603-4 DATED JUNE 10TH, 1944

SCHOLAR reports railway telephones many places BRUYERE region attacked. Railway bridge seven kilometres north east DOLE destroyed. SALESMAN reports all road rail telephone traffic stopped since D-Day. Strength BIESTRO MAQUIS now 1,000 inclusive recent additional 300 CORREZE gendarmes. SPIRITUALIST reports successful action D-Day targets LILLE area. DIPLOMAT reports trains derailed tunnel St. LOUP DE NAUD S. 60 and GOUAIX CLAMBOIN near LONGUEVILLE. All telephone lines cut including cable PARIS PROVINS TROYES. MARKSMAN reports road rail hold-ups AIN attacks German outposts proceeding successfully. POLY-GONE reports general insurrection SAONE ET LOIRE and AIN. BOURG and MACON attacked. Plan VERT carried out COTE D'OR night 5/6 June. ACTOR reports railways BORDEAUX LA REOLE and BORDEAUX HENDAYE cut several places.

Transformers BASSES PYRENEES successfully attacked. Telephone lines successfully attacked. Route NATIONAL 137 and BORDEAUX LIBOURNE attacks progressing. PERIGUEUX now occupied by Patriots. Street fighting in AGEN. Action messages to Belgium despatched June 8th calling Secret Army attack within forty-eight hours railway and road telephone bridges TELE-communications cables.

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13 June 1944

SOE/SO SITUATION REPORT No. 5
LONDON TELEGRAM No. 609 DATED JUNE 11 , 1944

MASON reports June 9th he controls all groups his region. Has MAQUIS 350 strong. Teams in position to attack railroad targets. WHEELWRIGHT reports June 10th LOT GARONNE MAQUIS working hard for him. Has taken four town ?un? named and attacking CASTEL JALOUX P. 22. JEDBURGH HUGH reported June 9th battalion Premier Regiment de France at LEBLANC Q. 08 joined resistance groups. Resistance groups INDRE total 3000. JEIBURGH'S GEORGE FREDERICK despatched night 9/10 June to SAS Parties REDON and GUINCAMP areas BRITTANY respectively. General KOENIG instructed June 10th DELEGUES MILITAIRES all region except R.5 curb guerilla activity owing to impossibility of sending arms and break contact for regrouping. Message despatched June 9th all F. circuits R.F. regions concerned interfere movement north ll ?armoured divisions? from Bordeaux.

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By

WJL

Date

JUN 11 1973

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13 June 1944

SOE/SO SITUATION REPORT NO. 6

LONDON TELEGRAM NO. 610 DATED JUNE 12th, 1944

Operations officer SAVOIE MAQUIS says railway bridge destroyed NOTRE DAME DE BRINCON 10 miles south of ALBERTVILLE. Also ALBERTVILLE and MONTMELIAN railway cut. DELEGUE MILITAIRE region R.4 says situation Toulouse difficult many police arrested. DELEGUE MILITAIRE region R.6 expects attacks by Germans and MILICE. DELEGUE MILITAIRE region R.1 acknowledges 8th June receipt of action messages. CROC saboteur regions R.5 and 6 says railway line LIMOGES VIERZON blocked. LACKEY says groups in position doing all necessary. DETECTIVE says his groups occupied MONTOLIEU during 24 hours without immediate German reaction. ACTOR says his teams mined all small bridges over route NATIONALE 137 and by now should be blown. MARKSMAN says MAQUIS AIN now hold OYONNAX NANTUA HAUTEVILLE and BELLEGARDE. SCHOLAR Teams effectively attacking railways. JOCKEY reports all telephones cut and no through trains. Acknowledgment received of Belgian action messages. SIT No. 4 refers. Two arrests reported Belgian zone 1 but organization is in order.

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By

ABJ

Date

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14 June 1944

SOE/SO SITUATION REPORT NO. 7
LONDON TELEGRAM NO. 612 DATED JUNE 13, 1944

Delegue Militaire reports all telephone communications cut June 7th except Paris-Vichy. Chef Ora region R.5 advises plan VERT being executed. No transport Rhone valley June 8th. Delegue Militaire region P. reports sabotage four adjacent locks canal Du Nivernais. Delegue Militaire zone Sud reports many cuts railway Valence Grenoble. Region R.5 Correze reported to have risen. Historian reports all his railway and telephone targets successfully attacked June 7th to June 9th. Minister reports railway Montereau to Nogent sur Marne cut and train derailed on line N.E. of Melun to Marles. Marksman states that in pursuance of S.H.A.E.F. directive to A.F.H.Q. for last four days he has completely cut following railways 1. Culoz Amberieu 2. Bourg Lons le Saunier 3. Lyon Bourg 4. Culoz Bellegarde also road traffic interrupted. Has (gr. mut.) ed civil administration food and finance area Oyonnax Nantua Hauteville Bellegarde. Actor has cut important telephone also railways in his area. Belgium liaison officer z one 2 reports extensive sabotage Limbourg started. Commander zone 5 acknowledges action messages. Air operations night June 10th/June 11th ISAAC ? British? leader Allied mission same name to Morvan area successfully despatched.

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By ABJ Date JUN 11 1973

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14 June 1944

SOE/SO SITUATION REPORT NO. 8
LONDON TELEGRAM NO. 616 OF JUNE 14, 1944

Region R.6 Maquis 4000 men retired to Char-
desaigues after being attacked. D.M.R. 1 reports
execution of plan VERT perfect and trying to curb
general insurrection which exists however Ain Jura
Part Saone et Loire Ardeche Part Massif (gr. Muti-
lated). R.4 extensive sabotage railways and high
tension lines. S.F. mission Benjoin says Maquis
Cantal under strong attack. F. Section has new cir-
cuit Glover area Chaumont situation precarious there
owing to lack of supplies. Ditrulr says all railway
and German communications under constant attack.
Footman says sabotage stopped railways and tele-
communications lot. Headmaster says all telephone
lines le Mans cut. Historian says no circulation
of railways round Orleans. Shipwright reports no
traffic railway Paris-Toulouse and Paris-Bordeaux.
Jedburgh Hugh reports Germans dispersed Maquis West
Chateauroux June 11th. Air operations night 12/13
June Jedburgh Hamish safely reach Hugh.

Belgium. Zone 5 rail cut Haversin to Hogne.
Bridge over River Lesse destroyed line Bertrix to
Poudrone cut. All zones have received action messages
putting plans into effect.

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JUN 11 1973

By WBS Date

15 June, 1944

SOE/SO SITUATION REPORT NO. 9
LONDON TELEGRAM NO. 623 DATED JUNE 15, 1944

Region A. Most plan Vert executed but supplies short also telecomm attacks repeated. Region C. Military plan Vert executed Meuse. Region M. Munitions becoming exhausted withdrawal to Maquis foreseen. Region P. 1 Most Saone et Loire and Ain controlled by Resistance. Region R. 2 Clashes with enemy reported. Region R.5 Strength F.T.?P? reported 5,000. Region R.6 Camp 15,000 men reported fighting Germans Area Espinasse. Benjoin Mission reports Mont Mouchet Maquis under heavy attack. Clergyman has 100 additional men circuit Versailles Juvisy. Jedburgh Hugh reports Maquis West Chateauroux dispersed, enemy activity increasing. Hugh instructed persuade Resistance withdraw to Creuse finally Massif Central if region untenable. Spiritualist reports railway objectives destroyed and telephone cables Lille to Bethune Paris Brussels Valenciennes attacked. Wheelwright June 14th holds Condom Nogaret Eauze Gabarret Maquis holds Castel Jaloux. Donkeyman started action on action messages June 6th. Massingham Jedburgh Veganin blown railway in tunnel Chaitis-soux also railway bridge St. Etienne de Maurs.

Belgium. Commander Zone 5 reports 11th and 12th June telecomm targets destroyed. Evremailles bridge blown, Andenne bridge destroyed, railway courriere cut.

Future plans. SHAEF agree principle allot supplementary 106 sorties re-supply crystallized resistance South France.

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By

DRS

JUN 11 1973

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AD/E/830

7 June 44.

To: G.M.

From: AD/E

SOE/SO Organisation in France

1. The attached appendices (in duplicate) give a brief outline of each of the French Regions (Appendix A) and the Independent circuits (Appendix B). All references are to map overlays which are also attached.
2. Approximate strengths for all the French Regions are given and, where known, for the Independent circuits. This figure should be treated with the greatest reserve.
3. The appendices have been made up to 052359B. Therefore daily Sitreps will commence on nights 6/7 June 44.
4. Please acknowledge receipt on attached form.

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By

APB

Date

JUN 11 1973

FRENCH REGIONS
STATEMENT OF EFFECTIVES OF F.F. I.

ON 18.5.44.

	<u>Maquis</u>	<u>Sedentaires</u> *
R.1	4,700	21,300
R.2	9,500	2,850
R.3	1,360	22,050
R.4	2,710	8,600
R.5	600	1,250
R.6	10,420	5,600
B	2,150	8,375
<u>Total</u>		
<u>Z.Sud</u>	31,440	71,025
A	2,610 †	46,100
C	11,200 †	22,400
D	7,350	8,100
M	2,780	3,750
P	3,500	66,720
<u>Z.Nord</u>	27,440	147,070
<u>Total</u>		
<u>France</u>	58,880	218,095

N.B. The source of the above information is B.R.A.L. These figures are considerably higher than the telegrams from the D.M. Rs lead us to believe.

* Sedentaires are members of the local male population living a more or less legal existence, but who are ready at any moment to take to the maquis if in danger of German acts of repression. Usually they undergo regular training.

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By WBS

JUN 1 1973

Region A.

Morale is healthy but resistance movements have not always been thoroughly effective, mainly because of shortage of stores (e.g. A.1 has had practically no deliveries), and also because of the lack of harmony amongst the various groups. OCM is influential, especially in the NORD, FTP are powerful in the mining and industrial districts of the NORD, PAS de CALAIS and SOMME. Liberation is strong through the GAS and CGT. The Region is generally strong except in Sub-Region A.2, but is hampered by German troop movements. There were many arrests among the O.C.M. in February. WT communication with this Region has been good hitherto.

Region B.

Must be considered an unknown factor for D-Day. A large following is claimed by one organiser but the state of armament may not be good. The Gestapo is very active in areas of BORDEAUX, and there were many arrests in February 44. At the moment there are no centres of wireless transmissions in B, nor is there a Delegation Militaire nor Chef d'Operations.

Region C.

In the ARDENNES resistance is promising. Arms and effectives are probably concentrated in the big towns, and there are maquis groups in the ARDENNES, MARNE and MEUSE departments (January 44). Heavy losses in the Bloc Est occurred in February 44. The VOSGES department, where there are substantial groups of Refractaires and which shows promise, was transferred to Region C.3 in May 44. A Special Mission has been despatched to the ARDENNES, to assist and advise the Maquis there.

Region D.

Little is known of this Region, though the HAUTE MARNE has great possibilities. The Region has suffered severely from arrests and in the DOUBS the situation is particularly obscure. The O.R.A. command certain forces of refractaires in the VOSGES/DOUBS region.

Region M (as a whole).

Owing to its wide area, it is difficult to foresee the extent of Resistance activities in M on and after D-Day.

Region M.1

MAYENNE: prospects are encouraging in this sub-region. There are considerable possibilities and plenty of arms in the ORNE department which the O.C.M. has in hand.

Region M.2.

Possibilities here are uncertain. There has been internal dissention, and there were many arrests and losses of arms in February 44. Resistance Groups however are coordinated under an authoritative leader.

Region M.3

MORBIHAN: This is a sub-region in which Liberation is interested, but which is in a state of chaos. COTES du NORD and FINISTERRE have very big possibilities which have yet to be organised. In the ILLE and VILLAINNE there are encouraging signs. The Groups are coordinated under an authoritative leader.

Region M.4

In the CALVADOS and EURE there are considerable possibilities and stores are plentiful. L'Organisation Civile et Militaire has this region in hand.

Region P.

This is strong in PARIS, the NIEVRE, YONNE and AUBE. The Organisation, whose morale is first class, is good, and should provide substantial support on D-Day. In spite of serious arrests of the staff of the region, the Organisation still holds firm. The number of sedentaries is very high, as one would expect in the neighbourhood of a capital city.

Region R.1

In January 44 the Organisation was described as more advanced than in any other area. Since then the enemy has been active, but the Region is holding its own. There was considerable Gestapo activity in the LYON district January 44, and Military law was declared in HAUTE SAVOIE 4 February 44. Operations against Maquis by German troops and GMR took place in February/March 44. State of seige was declared in LYON for a few days on 17 February 44. The MACON region was reported in a state of seige, and the Germans to have imposed a new regulation on 18 May forbidding the use of cars between 2100 hours and 0500 hours. Special Maquis missions have been despatched to the HAUTE SAVOIE and VERCORS Maquis. O.R.A. in the Southern Zone have been successfully incorporated into the F.F.I.

Region R.2

Gestapo agents posing as Chantiers de la Jeunesse were reported to be terrorising the population and looking for Refractaires (January 44). Action against Refractaires in the VAUCLUSE by German troops and GMR took place in March 44. From the point of view of Resistance the Region is weak in the coastal region through evacuation of the population by the Germans (March 44).

Agents based on Massingham and Algiers are fairly well distributed throughout the region.

Region R.3

From the point of view of Resistance the Region is weak in the coastal areas owing to evacuation. One-tenth of the population of SETF has been evacuated and this is probably paralleled in other coastal towns in the South of France (24 February 44).

Region R.4

Toulouse region was badly affected by arrests (22 January 44). There are 5,600 members of O.R.A. of whom 95% are armed, mainly concentrated in PAU, TARBES and TOULOUSE. WT communications are very satisfactory.

Region R.5

Departments of DORDOGNE, HAUTE VIENNE, CORREZE, are subject to partial evacuation and are declared Zones Interdites (March 44). 500 Gestapo agents arrived at CHATEAUBOURG November 43. There followed an outbreak of arrests amongst the Leaders of Resistance, but a new cadre of leaders has been built up.

Region R.6

Gestapo were reported to have been reinforced at CLERMONT FERRAND (December 43).

Department of CREUSE has been declared Zone Interdite. Organiser PYRAMIDE reported (April 44) that he had established a perfect understanding with the leaders of the Mouvement de la Resistance Unis: that complete union had been established with the Francs Tireurs et Partisans and Mouvement Prisonnier, and that the arms situation was satisfactory. A special Mission has been despatched to the CANTAL, and this is at the moment being engaged by German forces.

JUN 11 1973

The restrictions which the Germans intend to enforce in the Zone Interdite, (which includes parts of Regions A, M, B, R.2 and R.3), may have a crippling effect on Resistance as a whole on D-Day. It will probably be almost impossible to change locations and therefore the movement of equipes de sabotages and coup de main parties may be considerably hampered.

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By ABJ Date JUN 11 1973

INDEPENDENT CIRCUITS

EX-FARMER.

This circuit which is run by one of SPIRITUALIST's assistance, consists of about 900 men. Is of long standing, but lacks arms which cannot be supplied owing to flak in the area.

RACKETEER.

Small new circuit without direct WT communication. Good security. Some arms. Local contacts.

CLERGYMAN.

H.Q. NANTES. Targets organised. Very little material. WT contact. Control of Maquis groups near RAMBOUILLET and COMPIEGNE with large numbers of men partly armed.

SCIENTIST.

Very capable experienced organiser. Has had several deliveries but not enough arms for large circuit. WT contact lost about a week ago. May be recovered. Targets reconnoitred but not guaranteed. Large numbers of men scattered in area.

HEADMASTER.

New circuit under experienced organiser. Well organised. Well armed. Has WT contact and reports targets in good order.

HERMIT.

Recently established circuit under most capable organiser: with WT contact. Targets fast getting ready. Should do well.

VENTRILOQUIST.

Very old hand in command. Has WT contact. Deliveries good. Should do well. Has 20 four-men groups in SEINE et OISE, OISE, EURE and MAINE et LOIRE.

HISTORIAN.

Excellent organiser. Has WT contact. Not many stores. Targets not completely ready.

MINISTER.

Good organiser with good Lt. Has WT contact. Targets ready. Should do well.

SPIRITUALIST.

Started with special mission and has only recently devoted time to normal activities but progress good although lacks stores. (See also EX-FARMER above). The PARIS and LILLE circuits are quite distinct. Also has interests near BEAUVAIS. Has 250 men in the OISE Dept.

BEGGAR.

Strong new circuit with WT contact. Some stores. Reports targets ready.

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DIPLOMAT.

First class organiser with WT contact. Much experience in sabotage. Many targets all reported ready. Should do very well. Has recruited a company of about 100 commandos for D-Day action.

DONKEYMAN.

Very old hand with interests all over France, but not concentrated in area shown. Has very great experience in sabotage and guerilla work. Has stores and WT contact.

CONDOLIER

Small circuit with WT contact. Some stores. Targets satisfactory.

MASON

Relatively new circuit with excellent organiser and WT and plenty of stores. Experience with Maquis and sabotage. Very good circuit.

MESSENGER/TREASURER

Relatively new circuit. Recently reinforced by excellent lieutenant. Very good reports from this circuit show targets ready. Stores position satisfactory. In WT contact.

STOCKBROKER/SACRISTAN

Old established circuit. Has done much sabotage. Is very ably run. Has WT contact. Targets ready. Should do very well.

DIRECTOR/SCHOLAR

Has two branches as shown on map. Organiser at DOLE - has WT contact with London. Plenty of stores and targets are in hand. In Southern area position is not so clear, but targets are said to be in hand and should be dealt with satisfactorily. Stores position rather weak. Has 200 men in the BOUCHE DU RHONE, 300 in HERAULT & AVEIRON and 100 in DOLE also controls a maquis of 200 men.

PIMENTO

Is strong in railway contacts and has prepared an immense amount of sabotage to be put into effect when called upon and has already got much to his credit. Very capable energetic organiser with WT contact. Has 4,700 armed men in TOULOUSE and 2,100 not fully armed in MARTINET. In May 44 suffered heavy arrests in his VILLENEUVE SUR LOT circuit but believed that damage has been stopped.

MARKSMAN

First-class guerilla leader in command of Maquis AIN and SOUTH JURA. Has already led his troops to battle victoriously in minor engagements and can be counted upon to give a good show at all times. Absolutely first-class hardened warrior. Has WT contact with us. Following figures represent a very rough estimate of the present strength of the maquis under MARKSMAN's control:- ISERE 240, HAUTE SAVOIE 500, JURA 400, AIN 2,700, SAONE et LOIRE 3,800.

ACOLYTE

Organiser arrested but escaped. Circuit small. Targets limited. Stores limited but very secure.

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By

Date

 11/11/77

MANAGER

Friend of ACOLITE's. Same remarks apply. Has 80 men at ST. ETIENNE.

DIGGER

Sound organiser with WT contact. Plenty of stores. Has approximately 2,000 men in CORREZE and DORDOGNE and 800 in LOT.

JOCKEY

Very good organiser indeed with much experience. Great security sense and a most successful record. Have sent many stores, but area can absorb more. In WT contact both with LONDON and MASSINGHAM. Ready for reception of air-borne troops etc. From four centres (MONTELMAR, AVIGNON, DIGNE, CANNES); has direct control of approximately 10 teams of 10-15 men each for guerilla action against enemy communications. Can draw on Maquis camps in areas of LYON, GRENOBLE, MODANE, MARSEILLE and RHONE Valley.

MONK

Organiser killed. Circuit being reinforced by replacement. WT operator still active. At present only a few small groups but likely to double or treble on D-Day.

GARDENER

In contact with French organiser which has proved rather disappointing, but organiser has got his own circuits working on a small scale and has prepared his targets. Has 40 men in Marseilles and some 200 men at RIANS (VAR).

FREELANCE

In close touch with big F.F.I. groups totalling some 10,000 men in the MASSIF CENTRAL. At present engaged in fighting the enemy. We have WT contact.

FOOTMAN

In touch with Communist Groups who undertake Corps Francs activities and are under good control. Circuit will be strengthened. Has WT contact and plenty of stores.

SHIPWRIGHT/EX-FARMER

The best organised of all circuits. Recently lost its Chief through arrest, but is carrying on satisfactorily. Has plenty of stores. Two WT contacts. Very great experience both in sabotage and guerilla work. Can receive airborne troops etc. Thoroughly well run. Main strength of circuit in INDRE Department where there are approximately 4,200 men.

ROVER

Organiser recently arrested. WT still in contact. Situation difficult.

CARVER

Small circuit. Only in touch through ACTOR (q.v.). Recently formed. Has targets also at ANGOULEME. Good security but small.

ACTOR.

Very old hand. Sound WT operator. Great experience. Some stores. Has survived many alarms and is now going strong. Favourable reports on targets. Has 1,200 men in small groups mostly in the BORDEAUX area.

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JUN 11 1973

WHEELWRIGHT

A very successful circuit. Most capably run. Two WT operators in contact with LONDON. Plenty of stores. All targets ready. Has had immense experience sabotage, guerilla. Can receive airborne troops. A very good sense of security. An ideal circuit. Reports having 3,400 men North of the GARONNE and 1,000 men South of that river.

DETECTIVE

A small circuit. In WT contact with LONDON. Some stores. Targets ready. Guerilla work promising. Capably run. Can receive airborne troops. Has some 200 men formed into commandos of 20.

All circuits which have so far replied state they can receive officers in uniform; the number to be received varying with the staffs of the circuits and several, notably MARKSMAN, WHEELWRIGHT, SHIPWRIGHT, TREASURER and JOCKEY can receive airborne troops or gliders.

NOTE

Figures of strength quoted above have been given by the field. They are approximate only and in many cases are not comprehensive.

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by authority of

By Date JUN 11 1973

Donovan fac
file
confidential

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 June 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please hand the attached
memorandum to the President? Thank you.

Sincerely

WJ


William J. Donovan
Director

~~SECRET~~
~~DECLASSIFIED~~
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:


I attach a report on the activities of OSS Detachment No. 101, which operates in Northern Burma. That Detachment has been able to contribute substantially to current operations in Burma by providing natives skilled as guides and in ambush and sabotage methods. Upon the capture of the Myitkyina air field, the commanding officer of General Merrill's field forces sent a note to the commanding officer of Detachment 101 stating that without the help of OSS and the natives provided, he could not have accomplished his purpose. At the present time we have nearly 3,000 natives under arms in this area.


William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA 007622

By 

Date MAY 1 1974

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19 June, 1944

SUBJECT: OSS Detachment No. 101 - Operations in Northern Burma

1. OSS Detachment 101*, based in north Burma, is making a substantial contribution to the advance of General Merrill's forces in the area of Myitkyina. On May 18, the Commanding Officer of 101 received a note from Colonel Hunter, commander of the assault troops which captured the Myitkyina airfield, saying,

"Without the help of your people I could not have been successful. My thanks to them for their fine work."

The assault troops were conducted to the field by OSS guides, principally natives. The approach march was so successfully executed that, prior to the attack, the commander of the leading company peered through the bushes at the edge of the airfield and watched the Japanese at work.

2. This constitutes a successful climax to the assistance rendered by Detachment 101 during March and April to the forces serving under General Stilwell. For several months OSS has had northern Burma divided into districts, in each one of which there is an American officer in command of native troops trained by OSS to secure information and relay it by radio to district headquarters. These groups are also organized as resistance forces to engage in ambushing and sabotage.

* Detachment 101 is a unit organized by OSS during the late summer of 1942 for operations along the Indo-Burmese border. It now consists of 76 officers, 159 enlisted men, and an expanding force of approximately 3,000 natives. Its headquarters is in the Naga foothills near Jorhat, Assam.

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3. The first OSS unit which made contact with General Merrill's forces consisted of approximately 8 Americans and 331 natives operating generally in the Hukawng area north of Myitkyina but well in front of the Allied lines. It was organized in May 1943 with the aid of Kachin tribal leaders and a local missionary who had served in the area for four years.

4. This group assisted General Merrill first by supplying enemy intelligence and later by furnishing guides, terrain information, trail building, and security outposts.

To quote from a report recently received,

"From this time on, OSS had *** (the missionary) and at least 25 natives as guides accompany Merrill's command It was apparent that General Merrill now appreciated the value of native help in strange territory. He conferred many times daily and at night with *** (the missionary and native leader) who gave him all the information brought in."

Native guides proved indispensable because of the errors in the maps and new trails which are not shown. Consequently, each patrol was supplied with a minimum of 2 guides at the battalion command post and in addition there was a pool of 10 to 15 Kachins at the regimental command post. Through radio stations, Kachin patrols, and a system of native outposts, Detachment 101 had immediate first hand knowledge of Japanese movements and concentrations in the mountain trails along his route.

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5. Assistance was also given to the American forces in the selection of routes of march, determination of the amount of water available for pack animals, and the location of rice fields suitable for air drops and the evacuation of casualties. On numerous occasions 101 expedited the progress of the troops by clearing the trail of jungle growth, erecting bamboo bridges and guide rails, and cutting new trails where existing ones were incapable of being negotiated by horses or mules.

6. In addition to furnishing intelligence and security outposts, the native units have also performed duties as guerrilla troops. Operating across the Irrawaddy to the East, they furnished a diversion for the main body of troops, drawing off two companies of Japanese from Myitkyina at a critical point. Between March 6 and 19 one group of natives led by an OSS officer accounted for over 159 Japanese killed and an undetermined number wounded.

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Memorandum 2-44
~~TOP SECRET~~
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
file

27 June 1944

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Tully:

Would you be kind enough to place
the attached memorandum before the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
G. Edward Buxton,
Acting Director.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
07622
By ABJ Date JUN 11 1973

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

27 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following is a paraphrase of a cable from General Donovan which he asked be delivered to you:

"I had lunch with General Sir Maitland Wilson today. General Wilson stated that the conversations between Tito and Subasich went better than anticipated. The following was agreed upon:

"1. The Subasich Government would have a Tito representative.

"2. As part of his Army, Tito would accept Mihailovich troops who would be allowed to wear the Royal insignia as distinguished from Tito's red star. This would also apply to Naval forces.

"3. That ultimate determination of the King's position would be put off until after the war was over.

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By ABJ Date JUN 11 1973

~~TOP SECRET~~

WASHINGTON, D.C.
DEPT. OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

Wilson remarked that the chasing around the mountains which the Nazis gave Tito had had a healthful effect. Both Peter and Subasich are going back to London."

G. Edward Buxton
G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

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By Authority of CIA
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By DAJ Date JUN 11 1973

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

hours with his principal functional administrators. They explained their purposes, and I got the conviction that they will penetrate every phase of German life through men in key positions. The men, British and American, are competent and intelligent. Through the exercise of key positions they can exert a political influence of the highest order.

help to I believe that these men, properly coached and indoctrinated, could bring about a situation in Germany where portions of the Reich would petition the Allies to allow them to separate. It could be done by the selection of the proper German functionaries in the various services, and by the permission for assembly and discussion judiciously granted. No public declaration regarding separation need be made, indeed its very announcement might defeat its purpose. But if editors, chiefs of police, bankers and others were selected with this in mind, there would be a high probability of success.

I make the statement in the preceding paragraph having a vivid recollection of Germany in the years immediately following the last war. Then the Germans were flat, they urgently wanted counsel, they were ready to follow anyone who spoke decisively. The suffering of this war is going to be much more terrible for them, their receptivity should be so much the greater. Further, separatist elements have always been present in Germany. They flourish in direct proportion to the misery Germany is enduring. They were strong immediately after the last war. Surely they will be stronger after this one, in which they will have passed through so much more misery for which they will hold Prussia accountable.


Such an attempt as I suggest can only be made by agreement with the British and Russians, it can only be made through decision taken in the highest quarters. It can only have a chance of success if the Civil Affairs officers are most carefully instructed in advance of the time for exercising their functions.

It may not work, nothing in international life is a certainty. But if it did, it would have more possibility for good than any peace treaty that could be written. It might even be the basis for a genuine peace in Europe. It is entirely compatible with total disarmament, with punishment of the guilty, with all our declared purposes in this war.

I have spoken of this matter with Secretary Hull, and with one or two others in the Department of State. I have tried to make this so compact and brief that a busy man can read it.

Regards,

Sincerely,


Hugh R. Wilson

HRW/hhc

(5-142)

hms

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Please ask General Marshall,
Admiral King and General Arnold to
read this amazing report and to let
me know what they think we should do
about it.

F.D.R.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

8 July 1944

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please place the attached
memorandum before the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,
Director.

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By Authority of CIA
007622
By SPJ Date SEP 10 1974

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

8 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This report was prepared by one of our officers who was with Tito's command on three different periods. I thought you would be interested in the observations of an officer who had an unusual opportunity of seeing the situation at close hand.

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED

Summary Report on Observations in Yugoslavia
for the period 19 Sept. 1943 until 16 June 1944.

(Prepared by Linn M. Farish, Lt. Col., AUS,
Senior American Officer, Anglo-American
Military Mission to the Yugoslav Peoples
Army of National Liberation.)

I have been asked by Lt. Comdr. Green, USNR, Commanding Officer, Strategic Balkans Services (OSS), Bari, Italy, to prepare a report on conditions in Yugoslavia.

The basis for this report is approximately six months spent in the field during the periods 19 September to 3 November 1943, 20 January to 19 March 1944, and 16 April to 16 June 1944. Entrance to the country was effected by three parachute descents, on 19 September 1943, between Banja Luka and Mrkonj Grad, Bosnia; on 20 January 1944 at Bosanski Petrovac, Bosnia; and on 16 April 1944 at Shiroka Planina, South Serbia, near Vranje, between the Morava River and the old Bulgarian border.

During these periods I served as a staff officer under Brigadier F. H. Maclean, who commanded the Anglo-American Mission. In the first period, Capt. Benson and myself were the sole American members of the mission. In the second period, the American members were Capt. Selvig, Capt. Goodwin, Lt. Green and Lt. Popovich. During the third period, the personnel and conditions remained the same, with the exception that Lt. Popovich and myself were in direct radio contact with S.B.S. base in Bari. Our radio operator was Arthur Jibilian, SP(X) 3c USNR.

Lt. Col. Seitz, Capt. Mansfield, and Lt. Musulin, who were in liaison with the forces under the command of General Mihailovich, are all known to me. Col. Seitz is a friend of long standing, and I have perfect confidence that any report or statement he has made has been honest and sincere. Although not so well known to me, I am positive that the same applies to Capt. Mansfield and Lt. Musulin.

All of the above mentioned officers and men have, to my

knowledge, conducted themselves admirably under the most difficult conditions. The hardships they have undergone, the physical courage they have shown, and the mental distress they have experienced due to the confused position in which they have been placed, will probably never be known. I can only attest that their conduct in the field has brought credit to America and the Armed Forces of the United States. Placed in a perplexing whirl of external and internal politics, they have endeavored to maintain their balance and to report objectively on conditions as they saw and experienced them.

Severe cases of mental and physical exhaustion are certain to develop among those officers who have taken their work seriously. It is a known fact that the mental powers of certain British officers who have undergone slightly more have been definitively impaired.

The work which the American personnel in combination with the British personnel, both through the aid of the Yugoslav people, have performed in the rescue and evacuation of Allied airmen, especially American, has in itself been outstanding and a direct contribution to the war effort.

The situation in Yugoslavia has, from the beginning, been terribly confusing, and almost beyond the comprehension of an impartial outside observer. The deep rooted causes of the internecine strife are contained in racial, religious, and political disputes which are of such long standing that the people themselves do not understand them. The same applies to the present civil war, or wars being waged by the various factions. In the case of the forces of Marshal Tito and General Mihailovich, both sides tell exactly the same stories of incidents which occurred at certain places on the same dates, the only difference being that each side places the blame on the other.

Both sides proclaim as their aim a Free, United and Democratic Yugoslavia with a form of government determined by a free electorate of the people after the country has been freed of the occupier. Both sides tell the people that the other side is not sincere. The Chetniks say, and undoubtedly believe, that the aim of the Partisans is to force the indoctrinated communism of a minority on all the people. The Partisans say that the Chetniks are fighting to return the government of a few,

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which they claim is corrupt, fascist and dictatorial. At the same time, as stated above, both sides proclaim almost identical aims for the future of Yugoslavia.

Both sides attribute to the other the lack of effective resistance to the Germans. The Partisans say that they were betrayed by elements of the Government which are now included in the government-in-exile and the forces of General Mihailovich. The Chetniks claim that the Communists many of whom are now the leaders of the Partisans, particularly the Croats, committed acts of sabotage and prevented the effective mobilization of the Yugoslav Army.

Both sides claim that they have been attacked by the other in collaboration with the Germans and will cite time and places as evidence.

Both sides claim that they have not been supported by the Allies, and that in order to fight the enemy that they have had to first face arms in the hands of traitorous countrymen placed there by the Allies.

Both sides believe that their first enemy is the other, with the Germans and Bulgarians second.

We have in our possession direct orders from Mihailovich Headquarters to that effect. Many Partisans have told us that their first enemy is the traitor at their works. I am inclined to believe that in this case both sides are speaking the truth. They are their own worst enemies. When we were with the Partisans, our actions were more hampered by the Chetniks and other native elements than they were by the true enemy, the Germans and Bulgarians. Both the Chetniks and the Partisans are composed of men of unquestionable fighting qualities, men of terrific endurance and perfectly at home in the rugged mountains where no outsider could possibly find his way about.

On 21 May we watched 3000 men of the Partisan First Serbian Division march south from the Rodon Mountains into the Kukavicu Mountains where they engaged and defeated the Chetnik forces under the command of Major Djuric composed of 2000 men.

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The Partisans forces were 70% armed by recent sorties received by the British mission, of which at least 50% were American manufactured and of all aircraft received at least 90% were American and flown by American crews.

From a strictly military point of view, the Partisan attack on the Chetniks was absolutely necessary. The Partisan position in the Rodan Mountains was not secure. The Bulgarians and German positions protecting the railway were in the open valley to the North. The Chetnik troops occupied the mountainous areas to the South, which were admirably suited for an attack on the railway. If the Partisans attacked the Bulgarians and Germans to the North, they would have been forced to advance across open country, while the Chetniks could infiltrate into their rear leaving the Partisans no place to return when forced to withdraw by superior enemy strength.

So the Partisans attacked the Chetniks first, drove them out of a portion of the Kukavica Mountains, regrouped their forces, and on the night of 19 June attacked the large city of Leskovac, where they inflicted great damage on the enemy garrison and the railway center which they were guarding.

On 1 June, Lt. Popovich, of my party, Lt. Comdr. MacPhail, a British doctor, and his orderly, and myself, arrived in the Kukavica Mountains in search of three wounded American airmen, whom we found in a former Chetnik hospital in the area which the fighting had taken place. These airmen informed us that they had been rescued by the Chetniks, that Chetnik doctors had treated them as best they could, and that the people of the so-called "Chetnik Villages" had done everything possible to make them comfortable. They stated that a Chetnik doctor came back through the fighting for three nights to dress their wounds. They further stated that this Chetnik doctor had photographs of a great many American and British airmen whom he had treated and helped to escape from the country.

As we carried our wounded through villages which a few days before had been "dangerous Chetnik territory," it was heartrending to witness the treatment which they received. Peasants supplied carts, oxen, and straw. They lined the roads with food and drink, wreaths of flowers, presents of all kinds.

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Women stroked the brows of the wounded men, they cried and prayed over them. Men offered them strong drinks of rakija and called them brother but they cursed the Germans.

We saw both Chetnik and Partisan wounded. To me they were only poorly clothed, barefoot and hungry peasant farmers, some of them badly wounded, who had borne their pain with a forbearance one would hardly believe possible. I could not see any dangerous characters among them. I couldn't tell who was Left or who was Right, who was Communist or Reactionary. Somehow those terms that one hears used so glibly on the outside did not seem to fit the actual circumstances.

What a very peculiar set of circumstances these facts bring out! Rifles stamped "U.S. Property", firing W.R.A. Ammunition, flown by American airmen in American aircraft being fired at people who have rescued other American airmen and who were doing everything to make them comfortable and to return them to safety.

If I am confused, what must be the state of mind of the people of Yugoslavia. Add to what has already been mentioned as controversial between the Partisans and the Chetniks the strong propaganda of the Germans, Bulgarians, Italians, Nedic, Leotic, White Guard, Ustasi and so on. Is it any wonder that hundreds of them have taken us aside and asked us to tell them what to do, which way to turn.

In all of this welter of confusion, of conflicting reports and misunderstandings, a few pertinent facts stand out:

1. The vast majority of the people in Yugoslavia, and we have seen them in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Sandjak, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, and the Dalmatian Islands, are neither Right, Left, Communist, Reactionary, or anything else. They are a simple peasant type of people, strong willed hot blooded, with tremendous powers of endurance and great personal courage. They love intrigue and gossip, and are the most profound liars I have ever met. I do not believe there is any tremendous urge for Revolution among them. They love their mountains, their small homes, their farms, and their flocks. They want something better, but, measured by our standards, what

most of them ask is not a great deal, a good government, their King and their church, schools, more roads, shoes, clothing, a few modern conveniences, better modern farming equipment and some better livestock.

2. These people quite unique in Europe, have the will and the environment with which to effectively fight the enemy. Despite the confused state of their affairs they have caused him great difficulty and have killed large numbers of his troops. Retaliations against them by various enemies have never stopped and is not stopping them today. Rather it has made them more determined and increased their hatred of the enemy.

3. The senseless killing of these people by each other must be stopped. It is useless now to endeavor to decide which side first did wrong. Too much blood has been spilt, the feeling is too bitter, and too many men on both sides have uttered rash accusations and performed rash acts.

4. It does not seem to me that the Allies have done well in Yugoslavia. We have never presented a united front to them. I have always believed in Allied cooperation, that there should have been one Military Mission composed of duly constituted high-ranking officers of at least Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and the United States, who could have called all the conflicting parties together and taken such steps as were necessary in the form of a provisional government and military command to the end that the civil war was stopped and the maximum effort directed against the enemy. I have always opposed, as far as possible independent missions of the various Allies and have always worked to present at least an Anglo-American front to the Partisans.

However, as in the case of the primary issues between the Chetniks and the Partisans, it does no good to report what we believe should have been done. What we must decide is, what shall we do in the face of conditions as they exist today. It is too late to draw all the factions together into one group directed against the enemy under the guarantee of a free election without violence after the war? As far as the great mass of the people are concerned, it can be done, because they are

weary of fighting each other, but eager to fight the enemy. There are thousands who have buried their rifles and refuse to march with any group. There are thousands more who would volunteer if they could decide which side to support.

Only a few people on each side prevent a union from being formed--a few defeatists among the Medic group who believed it hopeless to oppose the German Army - a few Croats who hated the Serbs worse than the Germans - a few communists who would see their brothers killed to further their political aims - a few Serb Nationalists who classed as X Communists all those who did not agree with them - a few politicians who did not think of anything except to retain their power after the war - a few clergymen who forgot their teachings - only a handful of misguided people, in comparison to the millions who have suffered as a result of their misguidance, either honest or dishonest.

5. In all of this terrible story of misguidance, of rape and death and destruction, the one great power that I feel might have prevented it, or have stopped it, has never been used. The United States of America is mentioned in the same breath with God in Yugoslavia. We were the one nation on earth to whom the people believed they could turn for unbiased, unpolitical aid and advice without having to pay something in return. I am speaking now of the common man, not of Marshal Tito, General Mihailovich, or any one of the members of the government or the leaders of the various factions. How many hundreds of homes did we enter in which the people crossed themselves and thanked God when they found that we were American officers. Other of our officers, as well as British officers, have reported similar experiences. It would be difficult to express the utter sense of helplessness and frustration which we felt in the face of such complete faith in the ability of our country to right the wrongs which were so evident on all sides.

There is in the records of the 15th Air Force evidence from returning airmen that practically every faction in Yugoslavia has

aided in the rescue and evacuation of our men forced to descend in that country. This applies to Nedic troops, even Ustasi and Bulgars. But it is wrong to say that the people who have aided our men were Nedic. Chetnik, Partisan, and so forth - it is more proper to say that they were the common people of Yugoslavia, a people confused and suffering, suffering under the heel of the occupying enemy and then at the same time torn by internal strife. They saw in us and those airmen of ours the representatives of a powerful democratic nation in which people of all racial extraction, religions, and political beliefs live side by side in harmony, free to speak openly and to discuss their mutual problems without fear. In comparison to their own pitiful condition, it is not hard to realize why the free and abundant life of America, where we have at least partially solved the identical problems which now confront Yugoslavia, has taken on a more rosy hue than it perhaps deserves.

All this is not rhetoric, it is based upon hundreds of conversations with people all over Yugoslavia. It has been the experience of all the American officers with whom I have talked. The question that worries all of us is, how long can a great nation continue not to pay attention to the obligations contained in such trust and respect? How long can a great nation continue in this manner and still remain great?

6. I do not ask for aid to the Partisans, as I am confident that the officers who have been with the Chetniks will not ask for aid to the Chetniks. An exact literal translation of our reports should be interpreted in this manner but we are not Chetniks or Partisans, we are American officers who have been with opposing factions composed of the same people. When I have called for aid to the Partisans, and officers with the Chetniks have called for aid to their group, we have had the same person in mind - a barefoot, cold, and hungry peasant farmer, a man whose courage and endurance must be observed to be understood. To us they were not Communists or Reactionaries, Partisans or Chetniks; they were merely brave men who looked to us for aid with great confidence that it would be forthcoming. We would have been strange people if we had not responded - we could not have done otherwise, and been American.

7. It is not now a question of whether the United States should

send aid and representation to the Partisans. We have been sending them aid and have had representation with them for a long time.

During January, February and March of this year, we saw and received in Bosnia numerous night sorties, two mass daylight drops with fighter escort, one daylight glider sortie with fighter escort, and several night landings.

During April, May and June, we saw and helped receive in Serbia approximately 100 night sorties and one night landing.

Out of all these aircraft, something in the neighborhood of 300 with 60 in the air at one time, I have only identified 50 which were not American.

The Russian Mission to the Partisans was landed by gliders, American gliders towed by C-47's flown by American pilots and escorted by American fighters. The Russian Mission rode in the gliders and British pilots landed them. We have seen "Russian" aid dropped to the Partisans from "Russian" planes, yet the planes were again the old C-47's and the goods were largely American packed in American containers dropped by American parachutes.

We have helped to collect hundreds of tons of American radio equipment, drugs, foods, clothing, arms and ammunition, again dropped with American parachutes from American planes flown by American pilots. The first motor vehicle landed in Yugoslavia was an American Jeep and trailer - again with the faithful C-47.

Nothing stated here should be construed as anti-British, anti-Russian, or anti-anything. They are merely statements of facts intended to point out that we do have a very direct interest in what is taking place in Yugoslavia. It does no good to say that we are not interested in Yugoslavia and are not participating in the situation there, because we are, in a most material and effective manner.

I, personally, do not feel that I can go on with the work in Yugoslavia unless I can sincerely feel that every possible

honest effort is being made to put an end to the civil strife. It is not nice to see arms dropped by one group of our airmen to be turned against men who have rescued and protected their brothers in arms. It is not a pleasant sight to see our wounded lying side by side with the men who rescued and cared for them - and to realize that the bullet holes in the rescuers could have resulted from American ammunition, fired from American rifles, dropped from American aircraft flown by American pilots.

At one time I worried because America was not getting the proper recognition for her participation in supply operations. Now I wonder - do we want it. I can only hope that the small round holes which I saw in those simple peasant boys in the guerilla hospital in Lipovica village were not caused by cartridges stamped W.R.A., or fired from rifles marked "U. S. Property".

It is inconceivable that the combined strength and influence of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States could not put an abrupt end to the civil wars in Yugoslavia and guarantee the people a free electorate after the occupying troops have withdrawn and the hot blood has cooled. That it has not been done is, in the eyes of many, not a good portent for the future. The issues in Yugoslavia are ones which will have to be faced in many parts of the world. The Yugoslavians with their wild, turbulent, strong-willed nature, have abandoned Reason and resorted to Force. Is this the shape of the things to come? Are we all of us sacrificing to end this war only to have dozens of little wars spring up which may well merge into one gigantic conflict involving all Mankind?

I posed the above questions in a report written last November. They are even more apparent now. It appears to me that there are indications in the past few months that there has been less emphasis placed on the fight against the enemy and more preparation for the political struggle to follow the ending of the war. Under any conditions, two things stand out - every effort must be made to end the conflict among the people of Yugoslavia and the United States has a very definite interest in seeing that it is ended as soon as possible. This is furthermore atest of the ability of the United

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Nations, especially the three Great Powers interested in the war in Europe, to cooperate unselfishly toward a common end, that end being that the people of Yugoslavia shall be free to select the form of government and manner of living which the majority of them desire, free from undue external political pressure and the fear of armed internal minorities.

/s/ Louis M. Farish
Lt. Col., AUS

Bari, Italy
28 June, 1944

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LB

PSF: OSS, *Donovan folder*
2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 13, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL DONOVAN

Please take this up with the Secretary of State right away. We ought to block the Swiss participation in saving the skins of rich or prominent Germans.

F. D. R.

Returning copy of memo to the President 7/10/44 from Gen. Donovan re the restriction of Swiss bank dealings with the Nazis.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 1 1972

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Donovan folder
2-44

PSF
OSS

September 4, 1944

Miss Grace Tully,
White House,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing paper from General Donovan, which he has instructed me to forward to the President. Also enclosed is a supplementary memorandum from me on the same subject.

Will you be good enough to see that these papers are placed before the President as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheston
Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

CSC:R

Enclosures

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By Authority of CIA

007622

By DRS

Date MAR 8 1974

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

2 September 1944

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By Authority of CIA

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

007622

By WBS Date MAR 8 1974

SUBJECT: Future OSS Operations in Central Europe

For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that:

- A. (1) The German Army is in process of disruption and disintegration.
- (2) That at the completion of this process, there can result one of the following:
- (a) Seizure of political control by the German generals and the surrender to the Allies, or
 - (b) Unconditional surrender by Hitler or by someone in his behalf;
 - (c) Refusal of Hitler or his government to surrender with resultant occupation by Allied troops, establishment of the government underground, and the conduct of clandestine subversive warfare.
- (3) Of the above,
- (a) is unlikely because of the effects of the purge already administered to German generals;

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(b) equally unlikely because the Nazi leaders appear to believe that there is no way out for them except to fight it through;

(c) seems more reasonable to suppose.

If the assumption be correct, the ultimate struggle whether there is surrender or not, could well be a continuing war against the Nazi government gone underground and offering resistance not so much by a people's army or partisan groups, but by a highly specialized and skilled clandestine army of the SS type exacting support from the people by fear and intimidation and exploitation of a deep seated patriotism.

B. (1) The above is predicated upon the fulfillment of one of the two following hypotheses:

(a) That all of the elements shall quickly focus so that the German resistance will speedily disintegrate within the next two months, or

(b) That while these disintegrating forces are at work they are diluted and arrested by the Nazi control over the German people. But even

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so, they cannot resist indefinitely but will be overwhelmed by our superior power.

- (2) Our organization must anticipate the happening of either (a) or (b) and be prepared to act.
- (3) If either proposition should prove true, it is fair to consider the coming few months be viewed as consisting of two phases:

PHASE ONE.

The continued resistance of the enemy, in a military sense (though with reduced resources, depleted manpower) up to and within their own borders, with the gradual accent on organized subversion against our Army.

This will require a reorientation of our thinking. Up to the present we have been operating in enemy occupied territory. An important factor for the success of our activities in France was the determination of the resistance groups, as well as their willingness to accept the help and guidance of the British and ourselves in the employment of weapons and tactics within their area against the enemy.

But in enemy territory we will not find (as we

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have found in France and are finding also in countries like Norway, Belgium and Holland) friendly air strips, reception committees, organizers and leaders. On the contrary we must expect to meet (even though we try to make the enemy population do otherwise) the kind of resistance and the use of methods against us we stimulated against the enemy in territory friendly to us.

In enemy territory, OSS must do with its own force what previously we have had done largely through resistance groups we have organized and trained, and we must place behind enemy lines for operational purposes as we now do for intelligence purposes, men of coolness, daring and resourcefulness, who fully understand that they must depend upon their own enterprise rather than on support of the inhabitants.

For that reason, SHAETF has accepted the principle we urged of unblocking the joint control of OSS/SOE in such operations and recognizes that to carry on aggressive subversion behind enemy lines we must vest authority in our forward echelons and there must be freedom of action in our movements. But, with our allies, there must be the fullest exchange of information and the constant coordination

of activities.

PHASE TWO.

We are inclined to accept the manner of the last war's ending as the pattern for the finish of the present war. But the circumstances surrounding this war give it a characterization different from the last one. It is unnecessary to spell out the difference. We can have no assurance that one day the sound of guns will end and an armistice begin. If the basic assumption be correct, then there can be no armistice and no surrender and no German government left with which the allies can deal. Of course, with no central government, there would be confusion, but this confusion would give strength to the organized aggressive underground's opposition to the decrees of the Allied Control Mission.

This opposition could take many forms - propaganda, inspiring fear, coercion by passive as well as active means to incite the population against us. We would be obliged to meet it not only with firmness but with skill and ingenuity and comprehension. Counter measures will need to be employed from the side of intelli-

gence, propaganda and sabotage. We will be obliged to know those who are the leaders of the resistance movement as well as those whom we will be able to convince that their country's welfare requires the elimination of those leaders and who will have the courage to work with us against such leaders.

Therefore, we must plan and prepare for this eventuality. Accordingly, I have directed that each branch of OSS survey its manpower and other resources and direct its planning upon the hypotheses above set forth.



William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES **DECLASSIFIED**

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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4 September 1944

By Authority of CIA

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

007622
By DPZ Date MAR 8 1974

The following report has been received by radiotelephone from our representative in Bern. It is sent to you because of its direct relevance to General Donovan's memorandum to you of 2 September 1944 concerning "Future OSS Operations in Central Europe":

"According to recent reports from Germany, leading Nazis, such as Goebbels, Himmler, Bormann, Ley, Thirach, are being urged by their followers to continue the war at all costs and under all circumstances. To some extent, these leading criminals are no longer leaders, but are pushed by the inner circle of their followers, whom they fear. These followers have begun to do what they can to create in Germany a state of confusion which will permit them to disappear at the proper time.

"The total mobilization recently proclaimed by Dr. Goebbels is very helpful along these lines. It would be a mistake to assume that a large number of

Nazis have prepared their disappearance a long time ago. Most of these men until recently did not believe that Germany would be defeated. Only now the actual situation has begun to dawn on them, and only now have they begun their preparations for merging into the masses.

"Many important administrative offices are manned by Nazis, and are being dissolved under the pretext of total mobilization. However, the real purpose of this measure is to enable these men to disappear and take positions under false names amongst the masses of unknown industrial workers. Many well-known faces in the Party and government offices are no longer to be seen, and the Party is working systematically towards making its administration as confused as possible. The situation might be best compared to a carefully composed puzzle that is being systematically taken apart, and the parts are then shuffled as thoroughly as possible. On any other thesis, it is hard to understand why tens of thousands of people are being shipped from one corner of Germany to the other, for no visible purpose, and at a time when Germany

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is very short of transportation. In the light of this situation, there can be little doubt that after the impending military collapse of Germany many of the Nazis and their followers will attempt to reappear on the scene in new surroundings, as innocent citizens, and will offer their services freely to the Allies. Of course, this will not apply to the top Nazis who could not be disguised, such as Himmler or Goebbels, Goering, et al.

"The question of choosing the right type of Germans as collaborators will be one of the fundamental problems which the Allied nations will face on the day when they set foot on German soil. Under these circumstances, those Germans who have lived in Germany and have suffered under the Nazis, and who are themselves anti-Nazi, but know the Nazis well, will be the best-suited to advise us as to the proper persons with whom we can work. There exists in Germany a somewhat nebulous organization composed of Germans of this type, reaching down even into the smallest towns and villages. It has been largely built around the churches and the [REDACTED]

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remnants of the former labor unions. While the members of this so-called organization -- if you can call it that -- have done what they could to prevent Nazi atrocities, it is not likely that they will now engage in active armed rebellion. They are, rather, saving themselves for the post-war reorganization period. In order to exclude the Nazis from participation in the future administration and rebuilding of Germany, even if they reappear in sheep's clothing, it would be useful for the occupying powers to establish contact with this organization I mentioned as soon as they arrive in Germany.

"It is almost impossible for an outsider to appreciate the present ignorance of the German public at large with regard to the general military and political situation. Germans arriving in Switzerland are amazed when, upon their arrival, they discover through the Swiss press the true military facts. This ignorance has been considerably accentuated by the fact that an increasing number of privately owned radios have gone out of commission

and cannot be repaired for lack of parts and labor. The same ignorance prevails among the soldiers at the front about war theaters other than those where they are fighting. For example, German wounded from Italy, who just passed through Switzerland en route to Germany, were astounded to hear that Paris had fallen. To remedy this situation it is suggested that leaflets should be dropped in large quantities containing the daily military communiques from Supreme Allied Headquarters and the Russian communiques, and other factual information of this character. These leaflets should be dropped over Germany.

"Goebbels' article in Das Reich of last Thursday takes up again the theme of the secret weapon, and is quite interesting. Here is a very brief summary of it. The matter of catching up with the technical lead which the Anglo-Americans have over German armament is not such a rapid process as to become evident right away. It is equally indisputable that the present lowering in the German war chances is not in accord with the real war situation. It would be foolish to think that the trans-

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formation of the war picture in favor of Germany could take place overnight, when the first new weapons are suddenly put into action. The change will manifest itself comparatively slowly; so we must have some patience for this decisive process. It is of importance, first of all, that the most dangerous weapons of Germany's enemies, which is their technical and material superiority, should be gradually neutralized to a large extent, so that then the employment of our new weapons of an offensive nature can be carried out in all fields. It is not a question of a few new miracle weapons with which alone Germany expects a turning point in the war. The German war technique as a whole will have a new aspect in many ways, and then Germany's enemies will probably need just as much time to catch up with us. This circumstance, then, offers plenty of new chances for Germany in the further continuance of the war. We do not need to wait nearly as long as the Anglo-Americans, since our future offensive tactics will not constitute further

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developments of an old process, but an entirely new one, and we must be given a little time for this.

"The interesting thing in this article is Goebbels' plea for time, a somewhat new thing -- time to get the new secret weapons going, and he apparently does not predict that they will have a decisive effect immediately, as other propagandists have been saying."

Charles S. Cheston
Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

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Donovan folder 2-44
[REDACTED]
file 7
PSF
OSS

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

12 September 1944

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Tully:

Would you be good enough to have this dis-
patched to the President?

We believe that he will be interested to
learn that we are now receiving intelligence direct
from our personnel in Bulgaria.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Cheston
Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

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By Authority of CIA
007622
By DBS Date MAR 8 1974

[REDACTED]

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

12 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Donovan (who is presently out of the country) has asked me to send to you the following message which was sent out by our intelligence team in Bulgaria on 9 September:

"335 Allied pilots, including a number of wounded, are expected to reach Svilingrad 10 September for evacuation to Turkey. The Turkish Secret Police and President Inonu are cooperating to the fullest extent and have even sent a special train to Istanbul from Edirne with doctors. The Bulgarians are helping to the greatest degree."

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007422
By DBS Date MAR 8 1974

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

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Donovan folder
2-44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

20 September 1944

*PSF.
OSS*

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Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the attached memorandum concerning the present situation in the Balkans will be of interest to the President. Will you please see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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By Authority of CIA

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By WBS Date MAR 8 1974

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

20 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am enclosing a memorandum presented to me in London a few days ago by Subasic. I believe that it may be of interest to you.

Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment

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THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE BALKANS

We have to consider the present situation in the Balkans both from the military and the political point of view.

1) The military situation.

Bulgaria is out of the war. Greece can be liberated very soon, because the Germans are withdrawing from this country. The part of Roumania belonging to the Balkans has already been liberated. Turkey is not in the war.

Yugoslavia is therefore, at present, the only country of the Balkans in which active fighting against the Germans is going on. At the moment, the Germans have about 15 divisions in Yugoslavia, and these are constantly reinforced by German troops withdrawing from Greece or Bulgaria. They show no sign of withdrawing their troops from Yugoslavia and this means that they intend to fight on there. They are supported by their very loyal Quislings, Pavelic, Nedic and Rupnik.

Nedic, as well as Mihailovic, are not of great importance, and I might even venture to say, that they do not signify anything, because of the presence of the Russian troops on the border of Yugoslavia. You have had occasion to see the communiques of Tito's General Staff which state that there is a general rising in Serbia. I believe that this is a fact and

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you can be sure of it. The whole Serbian people - whether Chetniks, supporters of Nedic or partisans - will unite and fight the Germans and their Quislings. These latter will not be more than a handful of people. Should the Russian troops enter Yugoslavia, they will not find many Germans, because the people will already have mopped them up. Only in Belgrade or in other places with strong German garrisons can we expect any battle. In this way, the Liberation Army will be strengthened, and I expect that they will then go up the Danube and the Drava right to the most western part of Yugoslavia - Slovenia - thus cutting the German occupation army in two. If this should happen, then the Germans will be compelled to withdraw into the mountains and take up the same positions which our guerillas took up formerly. There will be only two ways open to them: either through Zagreb to Austria or through the mountains to Fiume.

In Croatia, the Germans count upon the Ustashis and the Domobrans. You can now observe a rising among the Domobrans who are fighting against the Germans and the Ustashis. This process will develop still further and, finally, all the Domobrans will join the Liberation Army. By this, the Liberation Army will be strengthened and the Ustashis will

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disappear. But the main fight with the German troops will be on Croat, Bosnian and Hercegovian territory.

The same applies to Slovenia.

If the Liberation Army is to fight this battle alone, I cannot see that Yugoslavia will be liberated before two months. The German troops in Yugoslavia are picked divisions and therefore, the fight against them will be long and sanguinary.

2) The political situation.

The political situation is more complicated and more delicate than the military one.

The Balkans are a mosaïque of nationalities. All these nations are very young, because they have liberated themselves but lately first of the Turkish and then of the Austro-Hungarian yoke. I firmly believe in the principle that every nation existing as a nation must be recognized as a national individuality. And if they are recognized as nations, they have a right to national sovereignty. From this point of view, they have the right to organize themselves within a State and to decide whether and in what way they wish to live in a common State with other nations. I believe that no single nation in the Balkans is able to organize itself and to form

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a State without the help of the Great Powers, because their ambitions are conflicting with each other. At this moment, when the war is coming to an end, and all the United Nations and Great Powers wish to build up a lasting peace, you will find the greatest appetites among the small nations.

I consider only the Balkans. When the Bulgarians had the chance to take something from other nations, they annexed from Yugoslavia the whole of Macedonia and a part of Serbia, and from Greece, the Greek part of Macedonia, etc. You can observe the same appetite in Albania. You are acquainted with the Pan-Serbian aspirations. You can see the Independent Croatian State. You have the example of the annexation of the Vojvodina by Hungary. You saw the Italians' and the Germans' appetite regarding Yugoslav territory.

In my opinion, it is necessary to create order on the Balkans because, if this is not the case, there will always be some Power which will make use of one of the small nations to create trouble and disorder within Europe. **DECLASSIFIED**

I am sure that the Great Powers, till now, have not discussed the problem of the Balkans among themselves.

Now, after the Soviet Union's declaration of war on Bulgaria and with the armistice talks regarding Bulgaria

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among the three Great Powers, I hope that the question of the Balkans in general, and of Yugoslavia in particular, will be taken into consideration.

Memorandum to William J. Donovan
from Prime Minister Subasic

September 1944

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